String Theory and General Methodology; a Reciprocal Evaluation by Johansson, Lars-Göran & Matsubara, Keizo
ar
X
iv
:0
91
2.
31
60
v2
  [
ph
ys
ics
.hi
st-
ph
]  
10
 O
ct 
20
11
String Theory and General Methodology;
a Reciprocal Evaluation∗
Lars-Go¨ran Johansson & Keizo Matsubara
Department of Philosophy
Uppsala University
Box 627, SE-751 26 Uppsala, Sweden
lars-goran.johansson@filosofi.uu.se,
keizo.matsubara@filosofi.uu.se
Abstract
String theory has been the dominating research field in theoret-
ical physics during the last decades. Despite the considerable time
elapse, no new testable predictions have been derived by string the-
orists and it is understandable that doubts have been voiced. Some
people have argued that it is time to give up since testability is want-
ing. But the majority has not been convinced and they continue to
believe that string theory is the right way to go. This situation is
interesting for philosophy of science since it highlights several of our
central issues. In this paper we will discuss string theory from a num-
ber of different perspectives in general methodology. We will also
relate the realism/antirealism debate to the current status of string
theory. Our goal is two-fold; both to take a look at string theory from
philosophical perspectives and to use string theory as a test case for
some philosophical issues.
∗This article has been published in Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics. The published version has the slightly different title “String theory and gen-
eral methodology: A mutual evaluation”.
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1 Introduction
String theory has evolved into a dominating field of research, perhaps the
dominating one, in fundamental theoretical physics during the last 30 years
or so. For a long time the hope among those in the field was that it should
be The Theory of Everything, that it should give us the answers to all the
remaining problems in fundamental physics.1 But the hope has so far not
been fulfilled and signs of increasing uneasiness in the theoretical physics
community can be seen. There has always been some opposition against the
theory and in recent years it has gained increased strength. The critics that
probably have received most attention are Smolin and Woit. In The Trouble
with Physics by Smolin (2006) and Not Even Wrong by Woit (2006) string
theory’s dominating place in theoretical physics is questioned. Their main
argument is string theory’s lack of new testable predictions despite heavy
efforts by a huge number of devoted physicists. But the majority of string
theorists do not seem deeply concerned; most still seem to be in good mood,
although the attack by Woit and Smolin has not passed unnoticed.2
Our first rough assessment of the situation is this: the majority of string
theorists are not convinced by the criticism, but they feel a need to come up
with a defense. This is profitable for the philosopher, because such a debate
will stimulate people to formulate hitherto more or less tacit assumptions and
norms. Obviously, those involved do not think the present lack of testability
is reason enough to give up. String theorists have not abandoned the quest
for testable results, as judged from what they say and write; on the contrary,
it is still eagerly wanted. But the situation is problematic and warrants
further discussion.
In this paper we will discuss what philosophy of science can contribute
to the debate concerning the scientific status of string theory. Earlier discus-
sions on string theory have often become too polarized and we believe also
somewhat too simplified. Here we will try to give a more nuanced discussion
and take a look at string theory from a number of different perspectives on
science. We will discuss what conclusions regarding string theory that could
be drawn from the perspectives of, respectively, logical positivism, Popper,
Kuhn and Lakatos. For a person with a strong allegiance to a specific position
in philosophy of science, this might facilitate a decision on how to evaluate
string theory.
String theorists hope that their efforts will result in an all embracing
theory, a theory that explains everything. Even a superficial reading indicates
1The world ’everything’ should not be taken literally; everything physical is the in-
tended scope!
2Cf. for example Chalmers (2007).
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that the explanation wanted is connected to realistic attitudes, whereas some
critics have less metaphysical convictions. Hence the realism/antirealism
issue is connected to questions about form of explanation and explanatory
value.
An important point is that one must distinguish between the mathemat-
ical framework of string theory and its physical applications. In this text
we assume that string theory is a theory attempting to formulate a quantum
theory of gravity and unify the fundamental forces, the single exception being
when we describe how string theory was originally thought of as describing
strong interactions. Applications of the mathematics of string theory to other
areas is not considered to be what we mean by ’string theory’ in this article.
Another topic that is relevant is whether to adopt an externalist or an
internalist perspective on scientific change. Our own views on these questions
will be revealed at the end of the paper, but the main purpose of this article
is to illustrate how different assumptions regarding science lead to different
evaluations of the scientific status of string theory.
Theoretical physics asks the most profound and general questions about
physical nature such as: What are the ultimate constituents of the universe?
Is there one unified theory of everything? How did the universe begin? Is
there any explanation of Big Bang? String theory aims to answer some of
these questions.
Such questions are intimately connected to philosophical issues. For ex-
ample, what kind of explanation do physicists have in mind? Why is a unified
theory of everything desirable? What norms are used when deciding which
is the best alternative route to develop an area of research? What needs to
be explained and what can be taken for granted, not requiring explanation?
In this paper we will address some of these philosophical issues; we will
try to describe and assess the ontological, epistemological and methodological
assumptions made by the string theory community. We will also assess the
criticism directed towards research in string theory. As has already been
stated, we will do so, not by just taking one view on science and scientific
method for granted in considering the scientific status of string theory, but
to discuss the questions from different perspectives. But first we need, as
background, an overview of string theory and theoretical physics in general.
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2 String theory - a very brief overview
String theory has evolved tremendously since its inception around 1970.3 The
basic idea is to explain the multitude of different particles as being different
vibration states in quantized strings. It started off as a theory about the
strong interaction. Originally a mathematical formula for certain scattering
amplitudes satisfying a number of requirements, which were suggested by
experiments and theoretical considerations, was found by Veneziano (1968),
but there was no interpretation of this formula. The formula was later, by
a number of researchers, derived using the assumption that we were dealing
with quantized extended strings instead of point particles.4 The original
version of string theory only contained bosons and needed 26 dimensions to
be consistent.5 Since the real world contains fermions the theory needed to
be modified. In this context the idea of supersymmetry was developed and
this meant that the theory could deal with both bosons and fermions. It was
then shown that a supersymmetric string theory require 10 dimensions in
order to be consistent.6 This is an improvement from the requirement of 26
dimensions; still, it is more than the four dimensions in the observable world
and hence an explanation for why the six additional ones are not observed
was needed. It was imagined that the extra dimensions were very small and
curled up or ‘compactified’.7
In the meantime progress was made in conventional quantum field theory
to deal with the problems concerning the strong interaction; hence most of
those active in string theory abandoned the field and went to quantum field
theory instead. This eventually resulted in the formulation of the standard
model.
3Here we give a very brief description of this development. References to some impor-
tant articles are given. For our purpose it is not necessary to do justice to the finer points
of the theory or its historical developments in any detail; only a short overview of string
theory’s development, an overview that can function as background for the rest of the
discussion, is required. To find more detailed descriptions and further references we refer
to the vast literature on the subject. Standard textbooks are Green, Schwarz & Witten
(1987), Polchinski (1998) and Zwiebach (2004). Suitable accounts for the layman written
by professional researchers in string theory are Greene (1999, 2004) and Susskind (2005).
The books by the critics Smolin (2006) and Woit (2006) also contain easily accessible
descriptions of string theory and its history. For a discussion on string theory written by
a historian of science see Galison (1995).
4 Susskind (1970), Nambu (1970) and Nielsen(1970).
5Lovelace (1971).
6 Neveu & Schwarz (1971) and Ramond (1971).
7There are other ways of explaining why we do not observe the extra dimension using
so called D-branes. This is however of no importance for the arguments presented in this
text.
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String theory contains a spin two state that could be interpreted as a
graviton, the quantum of gravity. This suggested that one could interpret
string theory differently, not as a theory for the strong interaction but as an
all embracing theory that could unify all fundamental forces and give us a
quantum theory of gravity.8
However, as long as progress was made towards the formulation of the
standard model the interest in string theory was low and only few researchers
actually pursued the idea. People also doubted that string theory could
provide a quantum theory of gravity free of the technical problems that had
haunted earlier proposals. But string theorists was able to give convincing
arguments for it being indeed possible to formulate a theory of quantum
gravity, and after this string theory became increasingly popular.9
Soon it was found that five different supersymmetric string versions could
be formulated, viz., type I, type IIA, type IIB, heterotic SO(2) and heterotic
E8 × E8. The latest view is that these five versions of string theory are
connected by dualities to each other and to 11-D supergravity. They are
all thought to be limiting cases of a still more fundamental theory, called
‘M-theory’, still very poorly understood.10
It was also realized that string theory was not only about 1-dimensional
strings. Other many-dimensional objects called branes (a two-dimensional
brane is a membrane, thus the generic name) were also accepted to play an
integral part of the theory.11
Strong arguments were then given that string theory allowed an immense
number of sufficiently stable vacua.12 This conclusion meant that the hope
to derive a unique low energy limit of string theory that reproduced the
observable phenomena of our world was abandoned by many string theorists.
Susskind responded by introducing the term ‘Landscape’ to describe the set
of string theory solutions and was one of the early proponents of the use of
anthropic arguments in the context of string theory.13
From this very brief overview it appears that string theory addresses the
following three main problems of theoretical physics.
1. The four fundamental forces in nature are today understood in terms of
two different types of theories. The electromagnetic, weak and strong
forces of nature are described by quantum field theory in terms of the
8Scherk & Schwarz (1974) and Yoneya (1973).
9Green & Schwarz (1984).
10Hull & Townsend (1995), Townsend (1995) and Witten (1995).
11 Polchinski (1995).
12Kachru, Kallosh, Linde & Trivedi (2003).
13Susskind (2003).
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standard model of particle physics, whereas the gravitational force is
described in terms of Einstein’s general theory of relativity. Both the
standard model and the general theory of relativity have been rigor-
ously tested and are now considered to be established parts of our sci-
entific world-view. Hence both these theories are plausibly empirically
adequate within very small margins of error.14
Unfortunately, the quantum field theory of the standard model is not
consistent with the general theory of relativity. This wouldn’t cause
much trouble for the physicist, in terms of predictions, if we could
ignore either quantum effects or gravity in every possible situation.
Often this is in fact possible, but not always; there are situations, for
instance the conditions that obtain at the very early universe or in
black holes, where both quantum effects and general relativity must be
taken into account at the same time, and in such situations our ability
to make predictions fail; we have no recipe for simultaneously applying
the principles of quantum theory and those of relativity. Moreover,
physicists seem to think that it is not satisfying with two unrelated
theories about the physical world; there should be only one theory that
accounts for everything. This problem, of finding a unified theory for
all the four (known) forces, is the main motivation for string theory.
2. Another thing that concerns physicists is the large number of different
particles and constants of nature. Their vast number make physicists
wonder whether they really are fundamental and to look for a theory
that explains them all as manifestations of something more fundamen-
tal. The string assumption provides just this.
3. A third problem is that the values of the free constants in the standard
model are inserted by hand. In recent years this appears less and less
satisfying; one wants an explanation.
For quite some time string theorists hoped that string theory would pro-
vide answers to these questions, but in recent years they have become more
pessimistic, in particular about the possibility to derive unique values of the
constants of nature. As stated above, it seems that there are many different
14While the standard model and the general theory of relativity have been empirically
very successful, the situation is not without problems. Straightforward estimates to cal-
culate the cosmological constant based on quantum field theory give results that are way
too high, by many orders of magnitude. This is a very interesting problem but will not
be discussed further in this article. The interested reader can read more about the prob-
lem of the cosmological constant and different suggested solutions in for instance Rugh &
Zinkernagel (2002).
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models of string theory and that our universe is a realization of one of them.
What this means for the question of the scientific status of string theory and
its empirical testability is something that we will return to later. Now we will
discuss how the present status of string theory would be described from the
view-point of each of four general methodologies presented by philosophers
of science.
3 String theory and philosophy of science
Four well-known theories regarding the development of science are logical
positivism, Popper’s falsificationism, Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions
and Lakatos’ theory of scientific research programmes. We will here give
very brief descriptions of these views and discuss what an adherent to the
respective view would say about the present state of string theory.
3.1 String theory from a logical positivist’s perspective
The logical positivists view on science have been severely criticized and it is
not a popular account of science today. Nevertheless the view has been very
influential in past decades and some of the ideas supported by the logical
positivists are still influential on how scientists view their theories.
It should be noted that the logical positivists considerably developed their
views during its heydays and there was no consensus on all issues, so the
presentation here is indeed simplified.15 The main goal for logical positivists
was to eliminate metaphysical discussions from science and secure a firm
empirical basis for the sciences. To achieve this goal they proposed a criterion
for empirical meaning of any statement, viz., that it should be given in terms
of the methods for verifying it. If no such verification method could be given
it had no meaning, i.e., no truth value. The main problem is to apply this
criterion to theoretical statements. Their solution and final view was that
laws, and theoretical statements in general, lack truth value; only observation
statements have a definite truth value and can be verified. Laws was held
to be mere instruments for predictions. This of course presupposes a very
sharp distinction between observation statements and theoretical statements
and this proved to be one of the profound and unsolved problems of logical
positivism.
Logical positivism could be characterized as consisting of verificationism
in semantics, inductivism in methodology and an instrumentalist view on
15See Carnap (1966), Nagel (1961) and references therein. A detailed discussion on
logical positivism can be found in Suppe (1977).
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theories. Its weakest spot was arguably the distinction between two types of
statements, those having truth values and those who have not.
Now, what would a logical positivist say about string theory? Would he
repudiate it tout court as speculative metaphysics?
First, the instrumentalist aspect of logical positivism doesn’t accord well
with string theorist’s own views. Since an instrumentalist holds that theo-
retical statements are tools for predictions, he has little reason to ask for a
unification of the four interactions, which seems to be the ultimate goal for
many string theorists. Asking for unification is most naturally interpreted
as expressing a realist attitude towards theories, whereas an instrumentalist
is satisfied with any set of assumptions, postulates or hypotheses that make
correct predictions of observable events. At most, a logical positivist could
endorse the search for unification for pragmatic reasons, if that would make
calculations and predictions easier.
Second, work in string theory is anything but an example of inductivist
methodology, it is rather more like suggesting new explanatory hypotheses;
a number of additional assumptions are introduced by which one is able to
reproduce quantum gravity and embed quantum field theories of the types
that appear in the standard model. But since no new testable predictions
hitherto has been made, one cannot say the new hypotheses have inductive
support. According to logical positivism, observations ideally comes first and
theory construction is seen as a systematisation of empirical data. Observa-
tion and theory construction is supposed to go hand in hand according to
logical positivists, which is certainly not the case in string theory.
Third, it seems impossible to interpret string theory as encapsulating
semantic verificationism. However, this last point is in our view of very little
interest, since few nowadays accept the form of verificationism espoused by
logical positivists.
Would a logical positivist dismiss string theory as metaphysical specula-
tion? An adherent of the first version of logical positivism, which required
complete reduction of theoretical statements to observational statements,
would do so, since string theory fails the verification criterion. The defense
that string theory is verifiable in principle using large enough accelerators,
suggested by an anonymous referee, doesn’t sit well with positivism; it is only
when we actually can put our theory in direct connection with empirical ob-
servations that the theory can be said to fulfill the verification criterion. But
an adherent to the later version, where theoretical statements are viewed
merely as calculational devices could be less hostile. If string theory would
succeed in reproducing all ’low energy data’ hitherto accounted for by GTR
and the standard model, it would have the same status as these two theories,
viz., tools for calculation. But so long as no new testable predictions has
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been made, this tool is no better than the earlier ones.
Summarizing, from a logical positivist’s point of view, the basic assump-
tions in string theory is neither true nor false, they are just tools for making
predictions about observable phenomena, and since no improvements in this
respect have been made, string theory is unsuccessful.
3.2 String theory from a Popperian perspective
To begin, an important aspect of Popper’s views of science16 was to sharply
distinguish between context of discovery and context of justification.17 The
importance of this distinction is that within the context of discovery there
are no methodological rules; the scientist can use whatever means he finds
suitable, including metaphysical speculations, when trying to formulate inter-
esting hypotheses. In contrast, Popper had very strict norms for the testing
of hypotheses. He endorsed the hypothetico-deductive method, albeit with
some idiosyncracies of his own.
Popper’s basic norm is that no theory that cannot be falsified may be
called scientific. Second, he holds that the scientist should reject a falsified
hypothesis and invent a new one. His third norm is that ad hoc assumptions
are strictly forbidden.
Now let’s move to string theory; how would a Popperian evaluate its
present state? Has string theory been put to a test yet and has it entered
a phase of ad hoc excuses, in either the stronger or the weaker sense, that
eliminate the testability of the theory?
From a Popperian perspective it may seem ad hoc to say that there are a
number of extra dimensions that are compactified. Defenders might say that
extra dimensions is not ad hoc assumptions but a core idea in string theory.
But, a Popperian may ask ’why compactify precisely six dimensions?’ This
idea is obviously geared so as to fit our observations of a four-dimensional
spacetime. The crucial thing is whether compactification of precisely six
dimensions is in principle independently testable, which is the reasonable
demarcation for ad hocness. This question is, so far as we can see, presently
undecidable and therefore one could not rule out that this assumption could
be tested in the future. On the other hand, we cannot dismiss the feeling
that the assumption of compactification of exactly 6 (or 7, if we start from an
11D M-theory) dimensions is ad hoc; why not all 10, or just one, as Feynman
asked in an interview (Davies and Brown, 1988, 194).
Presently, string theory is not testable in the sense that no new testable
16The standard text is Popper (1959).
17This was however a view that was also endorsed by the logical positivists.
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consequences, not already implied by the standard model or GTR has been
derived; this is the basic criticism against it and it is pretty clear that the
critics are inspired by Popper’s views.
But people in the field, Susskind for example, are not impressed. Susskind
calls the critics ‘Popperazzi’ and continued by quoting Feynman:
Philosophers say a great deal about what is absolutely necessary
for science, and it is always, so far as one can see, rather na¨ıve,
probably wrong.
(Susskind (2005, p. 192), quote taken from Feynman (1963, pp.
2-7). )
Susskind thus think that criticism inspired by Popper is not to be taken
seriously and he believes to have an ally in Feynman on this point. But
he has not, for Feynman’s view in methodology is more or less text-book
Popperianism, as can be seen from the following quote:
In general we look for a new law by the following process. First we
guess it. Then we compute the consequences of the guess to see
what would be implied if this law that we guessed is right. Then
we compare the results of the computation to nature, with exper-
iment and experience, compare it directly to see if it works. If it
disagrees with experiment it is wrong. In that simple statement is
the key to science. It does not make any difference how beautiful
your guess is. It does not make any difference how smart you are,
who made the guess, or what his name is - if it disagrees with
experiment it is wrong. That is all there is to it. ..... You can see,
of course, that with this method we can attempt to disprove any
definite theory. If we have a definite theory, a real guess, from
which we can conveniently compute consequences, which can be
compared with experiment, then in principle we can get rid of any
theory. There is always the possibility of proving any definite the-
ory wrong; but notice that we can never prove it right. Suppose
that you invent a good guess, calculate the consequences and dis-
cover every time that the consequences you have calculated agree
with experiment. The theory is then right? No, it is simply not
proved wrong. In the future you could compute a wider range of
consequences, there could be a wider range of experiments, and
you might then discover that the thing is wrong.
(Feynman (1992)[1965], 156-7)
It is also known that Feynman was quite skeptical about string theory, as
revealed in an interview Mehra made with him (Mehra (1994), 507).
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Leaving aside the views of Feynman, how did Susskind defend string the-
ory against criticism from a Popperian perspective? His strategy is argument
by historical analogy. He gives a number of examples from the history of sci-
ence in which a hypothesis that once appeared impossible to test now is not
only tested but also universally accepted. Susskind concludes:
Good scientific methodology is not an abstract set of rules dic-
tated by philosophers. It is conditioned by, and determined by,
the science itself and the scientists who create science.
(Susskind (2005), 192)
We agree with Susskind’s general remark here, that rules cannot be settled
once and for all by armchair philosophy. But it is equally important to notice
that Susskind does not question the requirement of testability, only the, in his
opinion premature, conclusion that a particular hypothesis is not in principle
testable. So in defending string theory against the critics Susskind makes an
inductive move; we have seen many cases of theories that once appeared not
testable but later has been possible to test, hence we are well advised to wait
and hope that also string theory one day will admit testing.
Is it, then, from a Popperian perspective, correct to say that string theory
is not acceptable science? This is far from clear. Popper himself held that
wildly speculative assumptions, even metaphysical ones, are admissible in
science, if they help develop testable hypotheses. Furthermore, he most
probably thought that what is required is falsifiability in principle, not that
it must be possible to falsify a hypothesis immediately after its formulation,
or at any particular moment of time. So a Popperian could accept string
theory as legitimate research while stressing that it has not (yet) produced
any testable hypotheses. The crucial thing is, of course, whether it’s lacking
testable implications really is a momentary or permanent feature. In contrast
to the positivists, in principle arguments are more palatable for Popper,
the reason being that he did not tie his views on scientific method to any
semantic theory. So presently unfalsifiable claims are considered meaningful
and this accords with the view among string theorists themselves. The most
reasonable description of string theory from a Popperian perspective is that
it is a viable project to work on, despite it being not yet testable. However
it is likely that a Popperian would say that although it is a legitimate area
of research it has not yet generated a truly scientific theory. A Popperian
would also stress that it is important to be open with this and not claim
success prematurely. It seems that Susskind could accept that.
The critics think, of course, that the time to give up is overdue, while the
defenders say it is not. Popper’s methodology, interpreted as ‘in principle
falsifiability’ cannot decide between them.
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3.3 String theory from a Kuhnian perspective
Kuhn was much more descriptive and less normative in his account of sci-
ence18 than Popper and the positivists. Furthermore, he adopted a third-
person, i.e., externalist perspective in philosophy of science, which entails
that scientific changes not always could be explained using the model of
rational deliberation as applied to individual or collective decisions in the
scientific community. Sometimes it is not scientific reasons that ultimately
explain theoretical change; instead social and other external causes are in-
voked. His main reason for this stance is that the conditions for rational
theory choice is not always satisfied. Kuhn describes the development of
science as alternations between periods of normal science and periods of rev-
olutionary science.
Kuhn considers the periods of normal science to be of more importance
than what would be suggested by a Popperian account, which focuses on
falsification and the refutation of previously held theories. Kuhn described
scientific work within a discipline during a normal period as governed by a
paradigm consisting of a set of metaphysical assumptions, formalisms, norms
and paradigmatic exemplars of successful solutions to scientific problems.
Normally these beliefs and habits are hardly articulated. Failures are usually
not seen as evidence against the paradigm; they are quarantined for the time
being as anomalies. Scientists working within the paradigm assume that
these anomalies can be dissolved by modifications of auxiliary assumptions
while the basic convictions are left unchanged. According to Kuhn it is
these periods of normal science that is the hallmark of science. It is when
you take a number of fundamental assumptions for granted and work with
‘puzzles’, which you try to solve in light of these assumptions, that most
scientific results are accumulated. If the scientists constantly were debating
fundamental questions they would not make any progress. According to this
view it is perfectly OK to use auxiliary assumptions to protect the basic
assumptions of the theory. But it might happen that anomalies accrue,
scientists begin to feel the pressure of many unsolved problems and they
start reflecting upon their basic assumptions previously taken for granted. A
crisis is on the way, and this may finally result in a replacement of the ruling
paradigm for another one.
Such a change is labeled ‘paradigm shift’ or ‘scientific revolution’; it is a
change from one period of normal science to another. Kuhn does not describe
this change as the result of a rational choice made by the discipline, since the
condition for rational choice, comparability with respect to goal achievement,
or commensurability, is not fulfilled. In short, paradigms are, according to
18Kuhn (1970)
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Kuhn incommensurable.
Many philosophers are highly critical of Kuhn for his incommensurability
thesis and we join the critics when it is directed to some extreme interpreta-
tions of incommensurability, viz., those that entail complete relativism. But
we need not take any stance on that matter at this point. Be as it may,
let’s look upon string theory with Kuhnian glasses and ask ourselves: is the
present status of string theory that of a normal science?19 Is there anything
like a string paradigm? Yes, we think so; there are symbolic generalisations,
metaphysical assumptions values and exemplars, which upholds a puzzle-
solving tradition. In addition, while there are competitors, string theory has
a very dominant status, which is a criterion for being normal science. The
odd thing is that it acquired this status before it has been able to make any
successful empirical predictions.
Our next question is if one could one use Kuhn’s theory to decide whether
string theory is in crisis and ripe for dismissal?
Our answer is a qualified no. Kuhn’s theory was never aimed at giving
a methodology with normative force, not even a recipe for determining the
status of current paradigms. It is best viewed as an account of history of
science, made in retrospect and from an externalist perspective. Its aim is
not to give any effective and usable criteria for when a paradigm will crumble,
but rather to describe the historical process in retrospect.
Are there more and more anomalies? Is there a feeling of crisis among
string theorists? The answer is presumably no. There have been profound
unsolved difficulties all along, of which some are solved, some not, and their
number has, as far as we can see, not obviously increased. That some critics
have voiced their opinions the last years is a sign of increasing dissatisfaction,
of course, but the majority doesn’t seem deeply disturbed. Thus, so far no
revolution is in sight. But one should keep in mind that that could change
rapidly and Kuhns’ theory doesn’t help us by providing any predictions.
Kuhn’s theory is, to repeat, basically descriptive and historical.
19 Audretsch (1981) holds that Kuhn’s theory don’t fit theoretical physics, because
there are two paradigms in it, a quantum field paradigm and a geometrical paradigm, the
latter being the framework for GTR. Each paradigm completely dominates its domain of
application. We don’t agree with Audretsch’ conclusion; For Kuhn, discipline borders are
described in terms of paradigms, so if there are two non-competing paradigms, they define
two sub-disciplines. But we agree with his point that quantum gravity may be seen as an
effort to unify two paradigms, a situation which is not discussed by Kuhn.We return to
this point later.
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3.4 String theory from a Lakatosian perspective
At first sight, one may say that Lakatos tried to steer a middle way between
Kuhn’s non-rational and non-normative account of paradigm change and
Popper’s strongly normative falsificationism. In his seminal paper, Lakatos
(1970), he introduced what he called the Methodology of Scientific Research
Programmes, MSRP for short. It contains a methodological norm, or so it
seems, while at the same time it takes into account the feature observed by
Kuhn that scientists seldom give up a theory or hypothesis when confronting
a few unfavorable test outcomes.
One important difference between Kuhn and Lakatos is that Lakatos held,
whereas Kuhn denied, that research programmes can be rationally compared;
they are either degenerative or progressive and the scientific community, if
rational, chooses the progressive over the degenerative one.
Another important difference between Popper and Lakatos is that Lakatos
accepted, while Popper denied, that there are crucial experiments that may
confirm a theory. These may be conducted when we have a new research
programme as an alternative to an old one; Lakatos maintained that in a
crucial experiment, one hypothesis is rejected and the competing one is con-
firmed. He also differed from Popper in holding that a failed test is by itself
not sufficient reason to give up; Lakatos stresses that we do not, and should
not, reject a research programme if there are no alternatives in sight; better
to work on the problems in an unsuccessful programme than to simply give
up.
Lakatos defined a research programme as consisting of a series of theories
and characterized by four components: i) the hard core, ii) the protective
belt, iii) the positive heuristic and iv) the negative heuristic. The hard
core comprises those assumptions that are common to all theories in the
series. That which changes from one theory to another belonging to the
same programme is the protective belt. Positive and negative heuristic tells
the researcher what to do, and what not to do, when pursuing the research
programme.
Lakatos overarching methodological rule for change of research programmes
was: replace a degenerative research programme by a progressive one! The
distinction between degenerating and progressive research programmes is
made in terms of what comes first, theoretical or empirical development.
In a progressive programme, theoretical advancements suggest new experi-
ments that then are planned and conducted. Then the empirical results come
out most often as predicted. This is to be contrasted with a degenerative pro-
gramme where empirical findings force the scientists to modify their theory
into newer versions within the programme by replacing components in the
14
protective belt. In a degenerating research programme the function of the
protective belt is akin to that of ad hoc assumptions; the difference is that
independent testability might be possible. So the methodological rule to give
up a degenerative research programme has an effect analogous to Popper’s
rule not to accept ad hoc assumptions.
But when has a research programme entered a phase of degeneration so
it is time to give up? Even a very progressive programme could come into
a degenerative phase for some time, and scientists were by Lakatos advised
not to give up too hastily. It is often rational to wait for some time before
giving up. In fact, Lakatos has not given us any effective methodological rule
by which we could arbiter between rational and irrational actions. Both to
give up and to stick to an ongoing research programme could be defended
as rational, given Lakatos’ prescriptions. Unfortunately, Lakatos died before
he had answered this criticism, so we don’t know what he thought about it.
Obviously, Lakatos theory needs improvement.
Or does it? Perhaps we only need a new perspective to evade the criti-
cism? This was Hacking’s point of departure in his assessment of Lakatos’
theory in Hacking (1983). Hacking’s defense was that Lakatos could be re-
constructed so as not to give methodological prescriptions for the individual
scientist, but to give a method for rational reconstructions of periods of his-
tory of science. The development of a science during a period can be judged
rational or not rational by the standards chosen, post hoc, by the philosopher
or historian of science, independently of the beliefs of those working in the
evaluated discipline.
Thus, the advice to give up a degenerative research programme in favour
of a progressive one might not be an advice directed to scientists but an
advice directed to the historian aiming at rational reconstruction of science
history. Every historian has to choose a perspective and some principles
for selecting which facts to take into account and which to neglect. Thus
Lakatos methodological rule is better stated as: reconstruct periods of history
of science in such as way that scientists are depicted as normally giving up
degenerative programmes in favour of progressive ones when the objective
conditions are fulfilled, disregarding their beliefs.
It does not follow, from adopting Hacking’s interpretation of MSRP,
that the concerned scientists, the agents being described, are not given any
methodological rules. Knowing about MSRP in Hacking’s interpretation,
accepting it and wanting to be rational, they should certainly follow the
replacement rule if possible. But they have not enough information to defi-
nitely judge their alternatives, so the replacement rule is not an effective one
for them. It is only effective for the historian.
According to a Lakatosian view one may also accept that many research
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programmes can exist in parallel and adherents to different programmes may
very well agree that one programme is more progressive than the other at
any particular point of time. But there is nothing irrational to pursue a
less progressive programme, although it appears that the risk for failure is
higher. One has no argument for saying that minimizing risks in chosing
research programme is the most rational option.
If one research programme is particularly progressive it will presumably
attract most researchers in the field and other programmes are simply aban-
doned. This is natural if we believe that scientists share a minimum set of
values, attitudes and vaguely defined norms.
After these interpretative considerations it is time to take a look at string
theory as an instantiation of a Lakatosian research programme. Here is a
selection as to what could be a plausible reconstruction of string theory’s
content, or part of it, in terms of the four components of a Lakatosian Sci-
entific Research Programme :
• Hard core: i)The fundamental objects are not point particles but ex-
tended objects (strings or branes). ii) Accept the basic assumptions
of quantum mechanics as given. iii) Require supersymmetry of the
theory.20
• Protective belt: i) The different versions of string theory are merely
different theory formulations, not different theories. ii) Compactified
dimensions are too small to be observed with present day technology.
iii)Explain the value of the constants of nature assuming a landscape
of universes.
• Positive heuristic: Develop the theory so one can i) explain the diversity
of particles as mere manifestations of one fundamental kind of objects,
ii) derive the constants of nature, iii) unite the standard model with
gravitation.
• Negative heuristic: don’t allow any modus tollens argument to be di-
rected against the hard core.
Comparing string theory with its competitors, e.g. loop quantum gravity,
it seems clear that the string programme has attracted most researchers,
which have developed the theory in many respects, and so one could say
20We assume that we talk about superstrings here. It should also be noted that super-
symmetry should be broken at lower energies in order to give a correct description of our
world.
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it has been progressive in a more general sense.21 On the other hand, using
Lakatos criteria for distinguishing between progressive/degenerative ones, no
such divisions can be made, simply because empirical tests has been lacking.22
However, there is a sense in which string theory confronts the observable
world. Take for example constants of nature. We have known their values for
some time. String theorists during one period hoped to be able to derive them
from first principles. The derivation of the actual constants failed, one got
a vast number of possible values and combinations. In response some came
up with the idea of a multiverse, consisting of an enormous set of universes,
each characterized by a unique combination of values of those constants.
This move fits rather well with Lakatos’ description of a degenerative phase
in which empirical findings drive the theoretical development, although in
this case the empirical results were known in advance.
Is the difference between knowing the empirical results in advance or not
relevant for the question whether the programme is degenerative? Of course
it is;. in a truly progressive programme new empirical results are predicted.
But conflicts with previous experiments could still be considered to have some
relevance. The move of postulating a multitude of universes as a response to
a failed prediction/retrodiction could plausibly be described as an instance
of a degenerative phase of the research programme. For there is nothing in
the hard core of the research programme indicating a multitude of universes,
nor that that assumption is needed for protecting the hard core from being
targeted by a modus tollens argument. This does of course not mean that
the hypothesis that there are multiple universes necessarily is wrong, but one
should at least be a bit worried. The existence of these multiple universes
has also been debated among string theorists themselves so it is clear that
this hypothesis is controversial even in the field.
String theory is a degenerative programme, according to Lakatos’ crite-
rion; the empirical facts against which string theory is tested was known in
advance, no new testable empirical predictions have been made, and the mis-
matches that have been found have been a driving force in its development.
Hence, if we read Lakatos as proposing a decision rule, the conditions for dis-
missing a research programme would be fulfilled, if there was a progressive
21It should be noted that quantum loop gravity while being a contender when it comes
to quantizing gravity do not attempt to unify all forces. Despite this less ambitious goal
we think it is fair to describe quantum loop gravity as a competitor to string theory.
22For a more detailed discussion on various approaches to the problems of quantum
gravity written for philosophers of physics we refer the interested reader to the following
sources: Rickles’, “Quantum Gravity: A Primer for Philosophers” in Rickles et al. (2008),
Rovelli’s, “Quantum Gravity” in Butterfield and Earman (2007), Rickles, French and
Saatsi (2006) and Callender and Huggett (2001).
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rival programme. This is however not the case so we can not really ap-
ply Lakatos’ criteria and recommend scientists to abandon research in string
theory.
4 Further remarks concerning string theory
and scientific norms
There is no general agreement about which perspective to adopt in general
methodology; hence, the evaluation of the scientific status of string theory
must be conditional on which stance one takes. Nevertheless, some general
conclusions are possible. The first is that, except for adherents to a strict
verificationism typical of the early logical positivists, no matter which of the
discussed positions you take, you cannot definitely and clearly reject string
theory as unscientific. Second, again with the exception of the verificationist,
no methodologist could definitely tell string theorists that it is time to give up
and do something else. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, not even a convinced
Popperian could say that string theory should now be rejected as a falsified
or unfalsifiable theory.
In our own view, the failure of now making a definite judgment about
what is rational vis a vis string theory is not at all astonishing. For if a
methodologist were able to do that, he would in this particular situation have
solved the induction problem; he would be able to tell us, on the available
evidence from history of science, what is the correct inference, i.e., he would
be able to tell us what is the rational way to proceed. But we don’t think
that is possible; as Quine once wrote ‘The Humean predicament is the human
predicament’ (1969, 72).
We hold Lakatos theory, MSRP, to be the most reasonable analysis of sci-
entific development; it fits quite a number of episodes from history of science.
It is also, to some extent, useful for discussing string theory and its competi-
tors, mainly loop quantum gravity. However one cannot really say that one
programme is progressive and one degenerative, because the distinction and
comparison is made in terms of theoretical and empirical development, and
no empirical development has occurred. On the other hand, without using
Lakatos criteria and instead merely relying on our somewhat vague notion of
development, one is tempted to say that string theory has been theoretically
progressive, but not empirically progressive. One could say that adherents to
string theory believe that theoretical progressiveness is sufficient for contin-
uing work on the theory, whereas critics think it’s not.
In a short article Cartwright and Frigg (2007) arrive at conclusions some-
18
what similar to the ones here presented. The authors end up by evaluating
string theory in terms of Lakatosian research programmes, although they
have used a broader set of criteria for determining string theory’s degree of
progressiveness than Lakatos did. They mention such virtues as i) a large
range of empirical applications, ii)successful novel predictions, iii) spawning
new technologies, iv) answering perplexing problems, v) consistency, vi) el-
egance, vii) explanatory power, viii) unifying power, and ix) truth. They
conclude that string theory has been progressive along the dimensions of ex-
planatory and unifying power, but that is not sufficient for saying that string
theory is generally progressive. The authors however does not recommend
dismissing string theory; referring to Lakatos, who is said to recommend us
to “treat budding programmes leniently” they conclude that string theory
deserves still being pursued. We agree that Lakatos MSRP does not give a
definite recommendation in a case like the present one. We also agree that
string theory deserves still being pursued, albeit we see no good reason why
most efforts in this area should be put on improving string theory; it isn’t
obviously superior to its competitors.
Their list of dimensions of progressiveness is hardly an interpretation of
Lakatos’ notion of progress, it is their own version. Two of their criteria, ele-
gance and truth, deserve a comment. As regards elegance, it could reasonably
be held that elegance, however it is made precise, is not a property of the
object but is in the eye of the beholder; it has to do with scientific taste’ and
other non-epistemic aspects and we don’t think such criteria should be used.
Second, we question their mention of truth as one dimension along which a
research programme should be evaluated. We may infer that a certain the-
ory plausibly is true, or approximately so, using all available evidence. Thus
truth of a theory is not a criterion but the aim.
One important aspect of Lakatos MSRP is not stressed in Cartwright
and Frigg’s article, viz., that one should abandon a degenerative research
programme in favour of a progressive one. In quantum gravity there are no
truly empirically progressive competitors to string theory, hence this rule can
not be applied. So what is the suitable strategy to use when no programme
is progressive? Neither Cartwright and Frigg, nor Lakatos give a definite
answer; some people may take the risk on working with alternative research
programmes before they reach the progressive state, some other may not,
and neither choice seems irrational. We return to this point at the end of
the paper.
We think that Kuhn has widely exaggerated the incommensurability be-
tween successive paradigms, at least when applied to science after the scien-
tific revolution. Kuhn did not differentiate between the case where an old
theory is believed to be strictly speaking false but still respected as a useful
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approximation and when a theory is abandoned as wrong tout court. For ex-
ample, Newton’s theory is still considered good science even though we now
hold it strictly speaking not correct, as a contrast to Aristotle’s mechanics,
which is false and also considered to be useless in scientific practice. The
change from Aristotelian to Newtonian mechanics is thus, in a certain sense,
much more profound, than the change from Newtonian mechanics to relativ-
ity theory and, in the field of micro physics, the advent of quantum theory.
Furthermore, we do not believe that scientists working in different fields or
research programmes have completely different norms; on the contrary, they
share several norms.
In Dawid (2009) it is argued that the conflicting assessments of string
theory is due to a difference in Kuhnian paradigms. We find these argu-
ments exaggerated. We do not believe that there is a radical difference in
methodology or criteria for evaluating success between defenders of differ-
ent research programmes in quantum gravity and traditional physicists. All
involved agree about the need for empirical testing and there is no sign of
there being radically different interpretations of empirical observations, which
was a characteristic part of Kuhn’s argument for there being incommensu-
rable paradigms. Dawid talks about a ‘metaparadigmatic shift’ since even
the methods have changed and not just the view of the world. This talk of
‘metaparadigmatic’ is not needed since methodological norms are included in
the concept of a paradigm and Kuhn held that methodological norms could
differ between different paradigms.
4.1 Why are tests of string theory required?
String theory has not, so far, predicted any new observable phenomenon and
it is understandable that people lose patience. On the one hand, this criticism
is serious; a theory that can’t predict anything new appears to be no better
than pseudoscience. But on the other hand, string theory’s basic aim is not
just to make novel predictions but to explain hitherto unexplained facts, so
why would lack of predictions problematic? Has the critics misunderstood
the goal of string theory?
We think not. We need more than consistency and explanatory power
as criteria for selecting the correct explanation, since explanatory power is
much too vague; there is no agreement about what an explanation is, not
even how to compare two explanations and telling which is the better one.
Most theoretical physicists do not seem deeply concerned about the present
lack of testability. Of course, they all would like a novel testable prediction
coming out true, but the lack of testable consequences have not, at least so
far, convinced the majority of those doing string theory to give up. Why not?
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We don’t think that they have dismissed testability as a necessary criterion
for empirical science, quite the contrary. String theorists simply hope to be
able in the future to derive testable consequences.23
Some critics might say that instead of looking for reasons given by the
researchers themselves we had better look for external factors that in fact
cause them to continue work within it, causes that do not provide scientific
reasons. Looking for reasons is to adopt an internalist perspective, asking
for causes that are not reasons is to adopt the externalist perspective.
4.2 String theory from an internalist perspective: ex-
planations
The three prime goals for pursuing string theory are, to repeat, i) to unify
all four forces of nature, ii) to explain the vast particle diversity, iii) to
derive the constants of nature from first principles. Fulfillment of all these
goals, not only the second one, could plausibly be called explanations, so the
reasons for doing string theory can be formulated as quests for explanations.
This motivates a look at what kind of explanation is suitable in fundamental
physics.
It is clear that the hope for an explanation embracing all four funda-
mental interactions (a ‘Theory Of Everything’) is strong impetus for those
doing research in string theory. But how does a satisfactory explanation look
like? The answer depends on ones metaphysical position; if your inclination
is pragmatist or instrumentalist, holding that all we want of science are reli-
able predictions, the difference between explanation and prediction is only a
difference concerning timing. We predict what will happen and explain what
has happened, but this is only a pragmatic difference; the logical structure
is the same, often held to be captured by the Deductive-Nomological model
of explanation, or its statistical counterpart.24
But if you hold that all scientific propositions are descriptions of the world
that are true or false, then explanations, in some sense stronger than mere
true predictions/retrodictions, is eagerly wanted. Most people are realists
in this minimal sense and so for example they might ask themselves: is the
correct explanation of particle diversity the one in terms of strings, i.e., one-
dimensional physical objects?
23For an example of a text where a physicist discusses the need for string theory to
confront empirical tests see Schnitzer (2003).
24An explanation is, according to the DN-model a derivation of the explanandum from
laws and other assumptions. In the statistical version the laws are statistical.
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4.2.1 Explanation as unification
A possible model of the explanatory structure of string theory, and of any
fundamental theory, is unification. There are at least two explications of the
notion of unification, Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1981). However neither
of these are entirely satisfactory. Albeit it’s shortcomings, we hold Friedman’s
attempt the better one. It’s general idea is easy to grasp: a statement, or
a set of statements, are explanatory and functions as explanans if it (they)
enable derivations of several laws and empirical regularities that previously
seemed unrelated and already accepted as being true.
It seems plausible that the prospect for such unificatory power is the
basic reason why many theoretical physicists are so fond of string theory.
The basic idea of string theory, that the fundamental objects are one- or
multidimensional objects whose internal vibrations explain their observable
properties carries great promises for unification.
The first aspect of string theory’s unificatory power is its ability to bring
in gravitation into a quantum theory of the world. This tells very much
in its favour, in particular since it was unintended. This reasoning has the
form of a ‘theoretical no miracle argument’: it would be a miracle that string
theory is able to unify the standard model and gravity if it is not substantial
truth in it. In contrast to the postulate of extended fundamental objects
however, alternative ways of unifying gravitation and the standard model is
not a priori excluded.
Since GTR was known in advance, one cannot literally say that string
theory ‘predicts’ it; it is rather a case of retrodiction. But this is precisely a
consequence of having proposed a unifying assumption.
The situation is analogous to that of GTR at its initial stage: GTR en-
tails that the perihelion of Mercury will precess. This precession had been
observed since long but no satisfactory explanation was available before GTR.
Since GTR was constructed from a few basic principles, its ability to explain
a known but hitherto unexplained fact count strongly for its at least approx-
imate truth.
4.2.2 Explanation of diversity of objects
Lee Smolin, albeit a critic of string theory, frankly acknowledges that string
theory explains the diversity of matter and force particles. The explanation
has the form of unification, in a somewhat vague sense. In short, assuming
that everything is made up of strings that propagate according to one simple
law is all we need to get started. He writes:
Indeed, the whole set of equations describing the propagation and
22
interactions of the forces and particles has been derived from the
simple condition that a string propagates so as to take up the
least area in spacetime. The beautiful simplicity of this is what
excited us originally and what has kept many people so excited;
a single kind of entity satisfying a simple law.
(Smolin (2006, 184).)
It is easy to feel the pull of such a forceful explanation, and we think
Smolin is right in saying that this beautiful simplicity, together with its using
previously well-known physical principles, is what makes people continue to
hold on to the string programme.
Let us only point out the epistemological structure of this explanation. It
is not the case that we knew in advance that there are strings that propagate
according to a certain law, and then physicists were able to show that many
phenomena thus could be explained. The epistemic order is rather this: we
have a problem, a confusing diversity of different kinds of objects, each kind
following specific interaction laws. Then someone suggests two hypotheses:
i) all objects are strings, ii) these objects propagate so that the covered area
is minimized. Then, using the usual method of quantisation, we can derive
the formerly unrelated phenomena. These derivations provide good reason
to accept the two hypotheses as true. If so, we have an explanation in the
form of unification.
The strength of the explanation appears to be strongly related to how
diversified the things explained are; the more seemingly unrelated phenomena
that can be derived from these two assumptions, the more probable these
assumptions appear to be, and the better unification we have.
4.2.3 Explanation of constants
From the basic theories in physics, the standard model and GTR, one cannot
derive the value of the constants of nature; rather, their values seem to be
completely accidental, and very lucky ones, because only a minute change
in any of them would make it impossible for any form of life known to us.
In short, it seems to be a miracle that the physical conditions for life in our
world are fulfilled. From this perspective a new and demanding explanation
request come to the fore: how do we explain the values of those constants?
Since the original hope of being able to derive the unique and correct val-
ues of these constants from first principles had to be abandoned, the present
idea is to say that different combinations of parameter values exist and cor-
respond to different universes.
That means that our world is just one of staggering number of worlds,
the number 10500 has been mentioned, Susskind (2005, 290). These worlds
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are not supposed to be just mere possibilia, but as really existing! Of all
these existing worlds, we live in one, and this is explained by the fact that
of all possible combinations of values of constants, only one ( or very few)
permits life as we know it. This is the anthropic argument. Many physicists
feel quite uneasy about it; is this really a viable explanation?
Our view is that it’s validity rests on holding all those worlds as really
existing; if they were mere possibilities, the argument would be a teleological
one. For suppose we take all the worlds as mere possibilia. Then the first
step in the answer to the question, ‘why do the constants have precisely the
values they have?’ would be that only our world is actualized. Why is that
so? This is explained by saying that this is so because we live in it. This
form of explanation would do if we believed that our existence is the result
of purposeful actions. But most physicists don’t accept such an argument as
a physical explanation. We agree.
On the other hand, if we hold that all the different worlds really are exist-
ing, the explanatory structure is different. In this perspective no purposeful
actions are assumed and different worlds with different possible combinations
are realized. Then life evolves, as a matter of course without any interven-
tion, in those worlds where conditions are suitable, and our world happens to
be one such. In short, the anthropic argument makes physical sense only if it
is taken for granted that many possible worlds are really existing. However,
one could then argue that assuming the real existence of the all these worlds
reduces the explanatory value because now we have more assumptions in
explanans.
Summarizing, string theory brings about unification all four forces of
nature and of the diversity of particles. But the third explanatory demand,
viz., explaining the constants of nature is more problematic.
4.2.4 Other applications of the mathematics of string theory
In addition to the demand for unification of fundamental physics, research in
string theory has also been justified by its contribution to the development
of pure mathematics, in the sense that it suggests interesting conjectures fit
for being proved more rigorously. These things are relevant for justifying
continued work on string theory, viewed as uninterpreted mathematics, but
provide no relevant argument for or against the correctness of string theory
as a theory about the fundamental interactions.
A similar remark can be made concerning attempted applications of the
formalism of string theory to other topics than fundamental strings and quan-
tum gravity. For example, using the mathematical results behind the under-
standing of dualities, attempts have been made to apply the formalism of
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string theory to other things. Dualities are seemingly different descriptions
and formalisms that have physically equivalent content. For instance a the-
ory of strings can be physically equivalent to a theory of particles and a type
of string theory on one background can be physically equivalent to a different
kind of string theory on another background and so forth. Exactly what this
means and how this should best be interpreted is a complicated and inter-
esting question that we will not discuss in this paper. One example is the
use of string formalism for describing quark-gluon plasma; see for instance
the review by Gubser (2009) and references therein. If such attempts would
be empirically successful, it would show the usefulness of the mathematics of
string theory; but it would not say anything about the string theory inter-
preted as a theory about the fundamental interactions or its ability to solve
the three fundamental problems stated in section 2.
4.3 String theory from an externalist perspective
Now let’s have a look at string theory from a a perspective in which scientific
activities are not viewed as purposeful deliberations and actions but as effects
of causes described in a non-intentional idiom.
In the debate concerning string theory, some critics have suggested that
non-scientific factors must be taken into account when trying to understand
why people have not left the business, despite its lack of empirical success.
Assuming that empirical testability is a sine qua non for empirical science,
there must be something else, i.e., factors external to the science per se that
has made people willing to pursue this research.
Another argument put forth by for instance Smolin (2006) is that now
almost all important positions in theoretical physics at major universities are
held by string theorists. Students are forced into string theory due to lack of
alternatives. It is claimed that other approaches to deal with the problems
of quantum gravity is not given enough funding and that this is not fair. Is
this a telling explanation?
As is well known, string theory was for quite some time pursued only
by a few number of individuals. They had little funding, being far beside
the focus of interest in theoretical physics. But they came up with results
that interested a wider audience and within a short time string theory be-
came mainstream. Today other approaches to quantum gravity have no less
funding than string theory had at the beginning. There is reason to think
that if people in a programme competing with string theory would come up
with good enough results, their approach would most plausibly attract more
researchers and get better funding.
The crucial question is, of course, who is to judge what to count as a ‘good
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result’; do adherents to different approaches share the same, or sufficiently
similar, norms regarding what to count as progress, or do they differ? If they
have sufficiently similar norms there is hope for a fair game. We think that
that is in fact the case.
To make the argument by Smolin more convincing one needs to make it
plausible that string theorists of today are more stubborn than the previous
generation of particle physicists who turned from their previous work into
string theory. One possible argument for that can be put like this. The
work done in particle physics using the framework of QFT produced many
testable results and led to successes. When scientists previously working in
this field turned to string theory they did not thereby nullify the worth of
their earlier work. In contrast, if a string theorist would give up and move
to another area of research he would thereby publicly show that he thought
string theory was a failure. Such a move is plausibly more difficult to take if
ones whole career has been confined to string theory.
However, as we have mentioned above, we do not believe that string
theorists have abandoned the idea that experiment is the final arbiter of
theories; there is still in the physics community a much higher valuation
of empirically testable and confirmed predictions than merely theoretical
results, however interesting.
5 Conclusions
We have in this paper discussed the present status of string theory from dif-
ferent methodological views, but also elucidated these methodological views
in the light of an ongoing research programme, about which we don’t know
whether it will be a success story or a dead end.
The long debate in general methodology has not produced anything like
consensus concerning norms for rational choice between competing theo-
ries/paradigms/research programmes in the same field. This negative out-
come is in our view to be expected and to be welcomed. This is so because if
there were consensus about a set of universal and permanent methodological
norms telling us when to keep on and when to reject a research programme,
these could only have been motivated by a priori arguments and independent
of actual varying practices. That would mean that philosophers of science
would have agreed upon a kind of first philosophy, an epistemology inde-
pendent of empirical and thus revisable considerations. We believe such a
position is untenable. We wholeheartedly accept that epistemology is part of
empirical science and is open for revision, as all empirical science. In short,
we accept the basic tenet of epistemological naturalism.
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It is common to argue for a particular methodology by using success
stories from history of science, which by their historical nature are such
that we know the outcome and we know that the scientists made the ’right’
decisions. It has, for example, since long been agreed that the atomic theory
of matter is true and those who opted for it took the correct decision; they
were rational. So one can raise support for a particular methodology by
describing this theory such that it fits the general methodology. But the
force of the example comes from the success. Looking at an ongoing research
programme/paradgim/theory such as string theory whose fate is unknown,
shows us that none of the well-known views in general methodology gives a
clear recommendation on how to continue.
An anonymous referee describes us as concluding that ’the jury is out’ and
wrote that that is old news. Thus he/she implicitly seems to want a stronger
normative stance on string theory. But we reject the idea that philosophers
of science can act as jury members in telling scientists whether a research
program should be given up or not. Philosophers have no such privileged
stance from which to decide such things. The role of philosophers of science
is to be active participants in an ongoing discussion on science and scientific
methods but not to lay down the law once and for all.
There is little reason to claim that theoretical physics in general, and
string theory in particular, has lost its aim predict outcomes of new experi-
ments. String theorists would of course consider the derivation of a testable
prediction as big success and if the prediction would come out true, the vic-
tory would be telling. That string theory so far has not been able to come
up with any testable consequences is disappointing, but not reason to lessen
the demands on physical theories and string theorists themselves shows little
sign of changing their mind on this issue.
Hedrich (2006) has a somewhat different view; he argues that with the
introduction of the landscape, research in string theory has become more like
metaphysics than physics, and he suggests that string theorists have been less
concerned with the lack of empirically testable consequences in recent years.
We agree that some string theorists are very speculative, but it does not
seem correct to say that string theorists in general have given up the hope
of testability. But of course, the longer it takes for string theorists to come
up with anything testable, the more speculative the endeavour appears.
The recent suggestions that there really exists a multitude of universes,
a landscape, seems wildly speculative. The critic might reasonably say that
the only reason to believe in the real existence of a multitude of universes is
that it explains, in a certain sense, the values of the constants in our universe.
But this explanation only increases our wonder; in what lies the explanatory
value of postulating a multitude of universes, enormously many more than
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the number of constants to be explained? It’s hard to see any simplification
or unification in this; what is needed are some independent arguments for
the reality of the multiverse. It should also be noted that for there to be any
kind of explanation it must be assumed that the other universes are actual
and not mere possibilia. The idea of the ‘landscape’ of universes has also
been controversial within the physics community.
A philosophically interesting conclusion to be drawn from the fact that
string theory still dominates theoretical physics is that those involved in
general have rather strong realist convictions. If they had no such convictions
their interest and stubbornness in pursuing this research programme would
be inexplicable.
Popular accounts of string theory, of which we have seen quite a number
in recent years, have not always been sufficiently clear about its speculative
character. In this respect it differs very much from for example GTR and
the standard model.
As already indicated, we think Lakatos theory, MSRP, in Hacking’s in-
terpretation, is the most viable view in methodology. But there is one aspect
lacking in Lakatos account, viz., the possibility of a merger of differerent
research programmes. We have seen some such examples in the history of
science. One example is Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics and Heisenberg’s ma-
trix mechanics.25 Also string theory itself is an attempt to merge earlier
research programmes.26 The possibility of a similar merger of ideas from
string theory and from some of its present competitors such as loop quan-
tum gravity should be kept in mind. Different research programmes might
be holding different parts of the puzzle. This we consider to be a good rea-
son for arguing for a more open attitude between proponents of different
research programmes especially when no programme is truly progressive at
the empirical level.
The situation for those who decide about funding of research in theoretical
physics is somewhat similar to investors in venture capital companies who
want to invest money in projects that will be successful in the future and
avoid waisting money on bad ideas. But no one knows in advance what will
be successful and there are good reason to think that most projects will fail
and few will succeed. So the venture capitalist had better not put all eggs in
the same basket, but to engage in several projects, in the hope that one or
two of them will succeed and the profits in these will cover the lost money
in the others.
25The view that it was just found out that two formulations of quantum mechanics were
equivalent is severely simplified. This has been argued in detail in Muller (1997).
26See also the discussion on merging in Audretsch (1981), where he discusses quantum
gravity in general.
28
The parallel seems sufficiently close for a similar conclusion regarding
funding of research; we had better not use all money on one idea, but to
diversify. There are no strong reasons to think that string theory is the only
way forward; another approach might very well be the correct one, and we
cannot know in advance which.
From our perspective we believe that a more pluralist approach is impor-
tant in a situation where no research programme is empirically progressive.
Still we think it is to be expected and even recommended that if one research
programme starts to be empirically progressive this programme will receive
most funds until it is again stuck and does not produce new empirical results.
This we think is in general a reasonable strategy to use for people providing
funds.
For a new programme to become progressive there need to be risk takers
that choose to work with a programme with dim prospects. To start a new
research programme or early on join a new research programme is a high
risk strategy. You will be hailed as a genius if you succeed and forgotten
or seen as a crackpot if you fail, just as the risk taking entrepreneur that
tries something new might become very rich or fail miserably. In both cases
predictions are highly uncertain.
Just as it would not be good for the economy if we all were risk taking en-
trepreneurs it would not be good for the scientific community if all scientists
were iconoclastic revolutionaries. A mix of risk takers, critics, and routine
workers is needed. The scientific community needs different kinds of scien-
tists working on different approaches and with different attitudes. Feynman
expressed an analogous view some forty five years ago in his Nobel lecture:
Therefore, I think equation guessing might be the best method
to proceed to obtain the laws for the part of physics which is
presently unknown. Yet, when I was much younger, I tried this
equation guessing and I have seen many students try this, but
it is very easy to go off in wildly incorrect and impossible direc-
tions. I think the problem is not to find the best or most efficient
method to proceed to a discovery, but to find any method at all.
Physical reasoning does help some people to generate suggestions
as to how the unknown may be related to the known.Theories of
the known, which are described by different physical ideas may
be equivalent in all their predictions and are hence scientifically
indistinguishable. However, they are not psychologically identical
when trying to move from that base into the unknown. For dif-
ferent views suggest different kinds of modifications which might
be made and hence are not equivalent in the hypotheses one gen-
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erates from them in ones attempt to understand what is not yet
understood. I, therefore, think that a good theoretical physi-
cist today might find it useful to have a wide range of physical
viewpoints and mathematical expressions of the same theory (for
example, of quantum electrodynamics) available to him. This
may be asking too much of one man. Then new students should
as a class have this.
If every individual student follows the same current fashion in ex-
pressing and thinking about electrodynamics or field theory, then
the variety of hypotheses being generated to understand strong
interactions, say, is limited. Perhaps rightly so, for possibly the
chance is high that the truth lies in the fashionable direction.
But, on the off-chance that it is in another direction - a direction
obvious from an unfashionable view of field theory - who will find
it? Only someone who has sacrificed himself by teaching himself
quantum electrodynamics from a peculiar and unusual point of
view; one that he may have to invent for himself. I say sacrificed
himself because he most likely will get nothing from it, because
the truth may lie in another direction, perhaps even the fashion-
able one.
(Feynman (1965))
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